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Summary 
The UK government’s bioenergy strategy anticipates the cultivation of between 300,000 
and 900,000 ha of energy crops by 2030. Yet policy incentives to promote uptake of perennial 
energy crops (PECs), notably the English Energy Crops Scheme (ECS), have had little impact. 
Less than 10,000 ha of PECs were being grown in 2013. To investigate the barriers to deployment 
a critical literature review and stakeholder interviews were conducted. These identified numerous 
substantial obstacles regarding PEC economics, alignment with existing institutions and factors 
affecting risk perception. Many of these are interdependent and involve a broad range of 
stakeholders. Agent-based modelling is proposed as an approach to explore the cumulative 
impacts of individual stakeholders’ behaviours under alternative policy and market conditions. 
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Introduction 
Bioenergy is widely expected to play a major role in the UK’s future energy supply (Slade, 
Bauen & Gross, 2010). The 2012 UK Bioenergy Strategy estimates it could provide 8-11% of the 
UK’s primary energy demand by 2020 and 12% by 2050 - a considerable increase on its 2012 
contribution of 3% (DfT, DECC & Defra, 2012). It is also expected to meet over half of the UK’s 
target for 15% of total energy consumption to be from renewable sources by 2020 (DECC, 2011). 
In absolute terms the UK’s bioenergy policy ambitions imply the generation of 200–650 
TWh from biomass in 2020 and 200–550 TWh in 2050 (DECC, 2012). Whilst the majority of this 
is expected to be produced from imported feedstocks, domestically-produced biomass is expected 
to play an important role. The potential feasible energy supply from UK biomass in 2011 was 
estimated at 75-148 TWh, with projections indicating this could increase to 93-143 TWh by 2020 
and 110-196 by 2030 (DECC, 2012). This growth is expected to be sourced primarily from energy 
crops  (DECC, 2012). These represented just 0-0.4% of total UK biomass feedstocks in 2011, but 
the government anticipates that increased planting and improved yields could raise this figure to 
16-33% by 2030 (DfT, DECC & Defra, 2012). Under such conditions, energy crops would 
provide 3-6 TWh of primary energy annually by 2020 and 18-64 TWh by 2030, equivalent to the 
cultivation of an area between 300,000 and 900,000 ha (DECC, 2012).   
Despite various policy incentives supporting perennial energy crop (PEC) production 
since the early 2000s, deployment in England remains minimal. This study investigates the 
barriers to uptake. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: an overview of PEC support 
policies; an exploration of barriers to PEC production; discussion and conclusions. 
Materials and Methods 
This paper presents preliminary findings from a critical review of academic and grey 
literature including policy documentation and industry reports, supplemented by discussions with 
expert stakeholders in the PEC sector. Table 1 summarises interviewees’ areas of expertise and 
lists identifier codes used in the text. This work has been undertaken to inform the scoping of a 
broader research project investigating policy options to promote PEC uptake in the UK. 
Table 1 Expertise and coding of interviewees 
Area of expertise Code Date Area of expertise Code Date 
Agroecology A1 3.7.15 Grower G1 23.6.15 
Agroecology A2 3.7.15 Grower G2 23.6.15 
Deployment patterns D1 18.6.15 Life cycle assessment L1 3.7.15 
Deployment patterns D2 2.7.15 Soil carbon  S1 3.7.15 
Farmer attitudes F1 3.6.15    
Results 
Policy support for PECs: the English Energy Crops Scheme 
The Energy Crops Scheme (ECS) has been the primary policy mechanism in support of 
PECs in England1. It offered establishment grants for new miscanthus and short rotation coppice 
(SRC) plantations from 2000 until 2013 (Defra, 2013). The first round (ECS1, 2000-2007) 
provided a fixed grant per hectare planted (£920 for miscanthus, £1000 for SRC) whilst the second 
(ECS2, 2007-2013) provided 40-50% of actual establishment costs2 (Defra, 2003; Natural 
England, 2013). From 2005 to 2009 farmers could also claim an annual payment of up to €45/ha 
from the EU’s Energy Aid Payment Scheme (EAPS)3 (EUBIONET3, 2011). Figure 1 illustrates 
the area of plantings awarded establishment grants throughout the ECS. 
 
Figure 1 Plantings approved for ECS establishment grants. Note: Applications for crops to be planted in 
2007 and 2008 (after the closure of ECS1) were accepted during 2006 – this explains in part the spike in 
uptake for this year. Data sources: WRAP (2009), Defra & GSS (2013). 
Unfortunately both rounds of the ECS failed to achieve their expected outcomes. ECS1 
resulted in 8,191 ha of new crops being planted against a target of 21,700 ha, and ECS2 in 3,601 
ha of new crops compared with a 40,000 ha target (Defra & GSS, 2013; Lindegaard, 2013b; 
ADAS, 2003; Sherrington & Moran, 2010). Further, of the £76 million funding allocated for the 
two schemes, just £10.3 million were awarded to growers, leaving a very large underspend 
                                                 
1 Similar grants were available in Scotland and Northern Ireland. These provided 40-50% (50% in less favoured 
areas) of actual establishment costs, up to a maximum of £1,000 ha-1 (NNFCC, 2015).  
2 This included ground preparation, fencing, planting stock, weed control, first year cutback (Natural England, 2013). 
3 Available for energy crops grown on non-set-aside land (EUBIONET3, 2011). EAPS is not thought to have resulted 
in signficant additional planting since most beneficiaries of EAPS also received an ECS grant (Defra & GSS, 2013). 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
N
ew
 p
la
n
ti
n
gs
 a
p
p
ro
ve
d
 f
o
r 
es
ta
b
lis
h
m
en
t 
gr
an
t 
(h
a)
Miscanthus SRC Miscanthus (cumulative) SRC (cumulative)
(Lindegaard, 2013b). By 2013 the total planted areas of miscanthus and SRC in England were 
estimated at 7,078 ha and 2,650 respectively (Defra & GSS, 2013).  
Barriers to perennial energy crop adoption  
A number of studies have explored barriers to the adoption of PECs in the UK (e.g. 
Sherrington, Bartley & Moran (2008), Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden (2013), Adams, Hammond, 
McManus et al. (2011), Karp (2010)). Here we summarise the findings of these and other studies, 
alongside additional issues identified by interviews. The barriers have been grouped under the 
headings of: economics, institutional alignment and risk perception.  
Economics 
Investment risk is a major obstacle since PECs typically have high establishment costs 
(Figure 2), uncertain financial returns and a long delay until first harvest. Profitability is uncertain 
and sensitive to changing market conditions. A range of estimates have suggested that at particular 
periods since 2000 PECs could have been competitive with conventional crops, however since 
the cessation of the ECS this is no longer the case (Figure 3). The rise of wheat prices since the 
early 2000s has further undermined the comparative financial advantage of PECs (F1, 2015; 
Sherrington, Bartley & Moran, 2008; Adams, Hammond, McManus, et al., 2011). The 
combination of diminishing returns and uncertain market demand has led a number of farmers to 
grub up their SRC crops (Hanson, 2014; G1, 2015).  
 
Figure 2 (Left) Estimates of miscanthus and SRC establishment costs. Figure 3 (Right) Estimates of annual 
average gross margins for SRC, miscanthus and winter wheat. Note: Alexander 2013 and Sherrington 2010 
assume provision of a 50% establishment grant; Nix 2015 assumes no grant. Source data: Alexander & 
Moran (2013), Sherrington & Moran (2010), Nix (2015, 2013). 
For new plantations the delay between planting and receiving a first financial return is 
widely understood to be a major disincentive (F1, 2015; Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden, 2013; 
Sherrington, Bartley & Moran, 2008). For miscanthus the first harvest occurs at the end of the 
second year, with subsequent harvests annually thereafter, but for SRC it is not until four years 
after planting, and subsequently every three years (Finch, Karp, McCabe, et al., 2009). The ECS’ 
establishment grants reduced the financial burden of planting PECs, but the scheme did nothing 
to alleviate the impacts of cash-flow disruption imposed by infrequent harvests (Lindegaard, 
2013b; Sherrington, Bartley & Moran, 2008; F1, 2015). It has also been suggested that the 
provision of establishment grants held the cost of planting artificially high. Two interviewees 
claimed that this effect has been compounded by oligopolistic conditions in the miscanthus and 
SRC markets, with a small number of planting material suppliers and large-scale biomass 
purchasers being able to set prices (A1, 2015; S1, 2015).  
PECs do not have a large established market within the UK, and there have been several 
high-profile cases of SRC supply contracts being cancelled en masse by UK power generators 
(D1, 2015; Sherrington, Bartley & Moran, 2008; Lindegaard, 2013a; Glithero, Wilson & 
Ramsden, 2013; Piterou, Shackley & Upham, 2008). These have left dozens of farmers saddled 
with a long-term commitment for an unwanted product in a small national market with few 
alternative buyers. The failure in 2003 of the first British flagship PEC-electricity project, 
ARBRE, left 1,100 ha of SRC stranded (Piterou, Shackley & Upham, 2008). Other cases have 
followed. Recently Drax, Britain’s largest SRC consumer, cancelled contracts with domestic 
producers due to the large transaction costs of dealing with many local suppliers (G2, 2015; F1, 
2015; G1, 2015). In some cases other power companies have stepped in to purchase these stranded 
crops, but prices are not necessarily competitive and stakeholders view such actions as “favours” 
rather than a demonstration of market demand (S1, 2015). The result is that PECs are regarded by 
some parts of the farming community as “wasted crops or something to grow if you’re desperate” 
(A1, 2015). The insecurity of the PEC market means that growers must go to considerable lengths 
to ensure their crop will be bought, increasing the opportunity cost of PECs as compared with 
traditional agricultural commodities. Whilst cereal prices may fluctuate, farmers can at least have 
confidence that conventional crops will sell (Sherrington & Moran, 2010).  
One of the arguments given in favour of PECs is business diversification. Globally the 
price of energy crops is closely correlated with that of oil and not agricultural commodities (TES, 
2013). The inclusion of PECs within a farming portfolio thus provides a hedge against drops in 
the price of conventional crops, as well as the event of these producing a poor harvest (Song, Zhao 
& Swinton, 2011; TES, 2013; S1, 2015). Some farmers are also producing PECs for self-
consumption, offsetting the cost of externally-produced oil or biomass (Hanson, 2014).  
Countering the benefits of diversification, however, is the importance of scale economies 
in modern farming. Interviewees estimate that commercially competitive livestock and arable 
production require at least 250 ha and 500-1,000 ha respectively (A1, 2015). In recent years this 
has led to an increasing trend towards farm specialisation (A1, 2015; A2, 2015). Switching only 
a portion of land to a new activity necessarily reduces the scale of existing activities, effectively 
increasing the amortisation cost of equipment per unit of traditional output (A1, 2015). It likewise 
prevents scale economies for PECs from being realised.  
A small number of growers have successfully converted their entire landholding to PECs, 
thereby maintaining scale economies (A2, 2015; A1, 2015). However full business conversion 
entails radical and disruptive changes, e.g. the exchange of existing machinery for new equipment; 
laying off (possibly longstanding) employees; the assumption of a new social position within the 
farming community (potentially foregoing involvement at traditional events). Such a major shift 
is difficult to reverse and farmers subsequently wishing to return to their former activity will likely 
need to restart from zero, contracting in machinery and labour. Given the extent of this social and 
cultural upheaval – as well as the economic uncertainties outlined above – this option is likely to 
be attractive only to a small subset of farmers for whom PECs offer particular advantages over 
conventional activities, e.g. retirees seeking to reduce their workload (S1, 2015; A1, 2015).  
At the time of writing no targeted and direct support for PECs exists in England and 
Scotland4. Subject to sustainability criteria PECs can, theoretically, benefit from policy incentives 
supporting the production of electricity, heat and fuels from biomass. However, subsidies 
provided to generators are not guaranteed to ‘trickle down’ to PEC growers, who in any case incur 
significant costs long before their product is transformed into useful energy services, and thus also 
before payments for energy generated are received. In light of this unsupportive policy 
environment and drawing on the shortcomings of the first two rounds of the ECS, it has been 
argued that any third ECS must be designed to tackle systemic barriers to PEC production – and 
not simply the costs of crop establishment (Lindegaard, 2013b).  
Institutional alignment 
PECs represent a significant departure from traditional farming activities. They thus also 
imply a shift from existing agricultural institutions5 and so must overcome inherent system interia. 
Particular conflicts centre around land commitment, infrastructure, subsidiary contractors and 
aggregators, and bureacracy, as we discuss in the following. 
The long term commitment of land required for PECs is recognised as a key deterrent for 
the majority of would-be growers (although conversely it is cited as a major incentive in a minority 
of cases) (Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden, 2013; Bell, Booth & Ballingall, 2007; F1, 2015). It limits 
rotation options for annual crops, weakening farm businesses’ capacity to respond to changes in 
wider market conditions (Sherrington, Bartley & Moran, 2008; Bell, Booth & Ballingall, 2007). 
Potential growers are also concerned by the costs to reinstate arable land: both removing PECs 
and the potential need to repairing field drains if damaged by SRC roots (Sherrington, Bartley & 
Moran, 2008; S1, 2015; F1, 2015). Perceived environmental benefits and risks – such as impacts 
on biodiversity and water quality – are cited as both important drivers and deterrents by farmers 
(Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden, 2013; Adams, Hammond, McManus, et al., 2011).  
Large-scale production of PECs requires specialised infrastructure for planting, harvesting 
and processing. Mechanisation is in the early stages of development, reflecting the commercial 
immaturity of the PEC supply chain (A2, 2015). Poor infrastructure has been identified as a key 
deterrent to would-be growers by farmer surveys (Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden, 2013), with long 
lead times to access equipment having the potential to severely undermine revenues (A1, 2015; 
A2, 2015). These effects are particularly pronounced for SRC since the overlap in equipment 
needs with conventional crops is minimal. Further there is a clear mismatch between the 
distribution of producers and equipment. SRC production is widely distributed across Britain and 
areas grown at individual farms tend to be relatively small: in 2010 40% of SRC English producers 
grew between 5 and 20 ha, whilst just 12% grew larger areas (Defra & GSS, 2013). Since SRC 
harvesters are expensive (interviewees cited costs between £150,000-£200,000), the majority of 
growers instead hire the machines6 (A1, 2015). The UK, however, has very few SRC harvesters: 
interviewees were aware of only four in England, three of which being closely located in the 
Midlands and Yorkshire. For smaller distant producers the relative costs to hire and transport these 
harvesters is therefore very high. The need to schedule harvesting in suitable winter weather can 
also increase costs (A1, 2015; A2, 2015).  
                                                 
4 In Wales and Northern Ireland PECs can contribute to the Common Agricultural Policy’s Ecological Focus Areas. 
5 ‘Institutions’ are here defined as for innovation and transitions theory. They are understood as ‘the rules of the game 
in a society, or […] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990). They can be formal 
(systematised and enforced by an authority, e.g. laws, regulatations) or informal (tacit and organically developed by 
the interaction of stakeholders, e.g. technical paradigms, shared expectations) (Markard & Truffer, 2008). 
6 Very small growers may harvest manually with chainsaws, but obviously this entails considerable labour costs. 
Interviewees note that contractors have played a critical role in the cultivation of 
miscanthus and SRC to date. This is particularly marked for plantations occupying only a small 
part of a landholding or where farmers have continued their conventional activities alongside 
energy crop production, since large investments in machinery are not justifiable in such cases (F1, 
2015). Further, recent moves by power generators to cancel smaller SRC supply contracts in order 
to reduce transaction costs signal a potentially important role for biomass aggregators (G2, 2015). 
This is bolstered by the observation that Drax has maintained larger-scale miscanthus supply 
contracts with Terravesta, a company which acts as biomass aggregator. Aggregators such as 
Cargill play an important role in conventional agricultural commodity markets, but very few 
companies are involved with the trade and distribution of PECs, and little support has been 
provided to encourage new entratnts. From 2004 to 2009 grants were also available to support the 
development of facilities to harvest, store, process and supply biomass feedstocks under the 
Bioenergy Infrastructure Scheme (total funds £3.5 million), but no direct financial support has 
been available since (Defra, 2005; Lindegaard, 2014). It has been suggested that the lack of 
predictable support for necessary subsidiary services has undermined the development of the 
energy crops supply chain (F1, 2015), notably contributing to the bankruptcy in 2009 of Bical 
(formerly the UK’s leading miscanthus cultivator and aggregator) (F1, 2015). The company held 
a 300,000 tonnes per annum supply contact with Drax (Stocks, 2007). Its demise left many farmers 
without a market for their crop, damaging miscanthus’ public image and its perceived risk profile 
with would-be growers (Lindegaard, 2012; F1, 2015).  
The ECS’ bureaucratic application process, slow payments and strict eligibility conditions 
are also considered a deterrent to PECs (G1, 2015; A1, 2015; A2, 2015) One of the most contested 
issues is the requirement for growers to secure a supply contract at the time of planting, up to four 
years ahead of the first harvest (Defra, 2003; Natural England, 2013). Farmers believe that this 
reduced their power in price negotiations, already weakened by the early 2000s’ context of low 
wheat prices (F1, 2015). This has compounded the ‘chicken and egg’ problem of market 
development: in regions without an established and reliable biomass market farmers received little 
support to develop new local markets, but potential consumers without a reliable existing biomass 
supply of course had little incentive to invest in bioenergy technologies (Sherrington, Bartley & 
Moran, 2008; Lindegaard, 2013b; F1, 2015).  
Risk perceptions 
Interviewees identified a number of additional issues that have affected farmers’ risk 
perceptions of PECs, notably the inconsistency of policy incentives, the insufficient provision of 
extension services, and the legacy of failed projects. The following explores each in turn. 
During the 1990s energy crops suffered from inadequate contract prices, unanticipated 
taxation and (eventually) the removal of targeted support under the Non-Fossil Fuels Obligation 
(NFFO) (Mitchell & Connor, 2004). The ECS provided a clearer policy driver for energy crop 
production, but the sector’s development stalled between 2006 and 2008 due to a 17 month hiatus 
in support between the closure of ECS1 and the start of ECS2 (Aylott & McDermott, 2012). ECS2 
itself closed to new applications in August 2013 (Government, 2014), amid considerable 
speculation about prospects for a third Scheme. Fluctuations in policy support have obviously 
raised investment risk, and no proposals for a third ECS have been published at the time of writing. 
Ease of crop management is one of the primary motivations for PECs cited by farmers 
(Glithero, Ramsden & Wilson, 2013). PECs are known to typically require fewer inputs than 
cereals, and whilst establishment and harvesting can be labour intensive, such activities are less 
frequent than for conventional crops (A1, 2015; A2, 2015; S1, 2015). Care is nonetheless required 
to achieve good yields and to harness secondary benefits on soil quality, with key activities 
including preparation of the soil prior to planting, fertilisation during the early years of growth, 
and winter harvesting (which promotes plant health and produces better quality fuel) (ibid.). The 
ECS’ establishment grants provided a motivation to plant energy crops, however they did not 
necessarily incentivise good crop care or yield maximisation, and it is thought that some growers 
did not care well for their crops due to either ignorance or lack of interest (A1, 2015; A2, 2015). 
Poor yields due to inadequate husbandry are thought to have damaged the public image of both 
miscanthus and SRC (A1, 2015; A2, 2015; S1, 2015), and farmers themselves have criticised the 
lack of available information and extension services, noting this as a deterrent to uptake 
(Sherrington, Bartley & Moran, 2008; Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden, 2013). This has also made it 
difficult for farmers to evaluate the reliability of information provided by third parties. Only a few 
organisations currently supply PEC planting materials in the UK and there are concerns that some 
are marketing PECs on the basis of unrealistic yield and price claims (A1, 2015; F1, 2015).  
Tarnishing PECs’ reputation still further, several flagship bioenergy projects intended to 
utilise domestically-grown PECs have failed to reach fruition. Some have stalled after the 
plantation of crops intended to fuel them, with severe consequences for the farmers concerned, 
e.g. ARBRE and East Midlands Airport Biomass Boiler (Piterou, Shackley & Upham, 2008; A1, 
2015; A2, 2015). Others, such as the Winkleigh Biomass Gasifier and Ambient Energy project 
proposed for Cricklade, have faced public opposition and were denied planning permission – 
highlighting the difficulty of growing new markets (G1, 2015; Upham, 2009; Upreti & van der 
Horst, 2004).  
Discussion 
The mismatch between barriers to PEC uptake and historical policy support 
Slow progress in the implementation of PECs can be attributed to a broad range of barriers 
– most of which were not addressed by the ECS. These include economic factors (e.g. the high 
cost of establishment and exit, insecure market demand, uncertain profitability, the delay to 
financial return); poor institutional alignment (long-term land commitments, insufficient 
infrastructure, few crop service providers); and other factors affecting risk perception (faltering 
policy support, failed flagship projects, insufficient extension services). The ECS’ one-off 
establishment grants helped to alleviate the costs of new crop plantings for farmers but they did 
not mitigate broader economic concerns (in fact, prescriptive eligibility conditions may have 
weakened farmer powers in contract negotiations), nor did they support other stakeholder parties 
considered crucial to deployment. Moreover the scheme neither promoted farmer upskilling nor 
incentivised yield maximisation, with resultant poor crop care thought to have fuelled perceptions 
of PECs as unproductive. Onerous application requirements and lengthy assessment delays have 
also increased the opportunity costs of ECS participation, whilst the long hiatus in grant provision 
between ECS rounds has damaged investor confidence and allegedly undermined the viability of 
businesses established to provide the subsidiary services so badly needed by growers. 
Despite an apparent awareness of the need to develop domestic biomass supplies and 
repeated announcements of ambition for large-scale PEC cultivation, policy support has 
fluctuated considerably over the last 20 years. The ECS has been England’s primary support 
mechanism for PECs, with other policy measures being either transient, insubstantial or not 
clearly targeted to PEC uptake. Any new policy approach should recognise the particular 
challenges presented by the need to develop all stages of the PEC supply chain simultaneously – 
from on-farm planting and cultivation, to harvesting, storage, processing, and eventual electricity, 
heat or fuel generation (Mitchell & Connor, 2004). If just one of these is ineffective, or adjacent 
stages are not efficiently linked, then the entire supply chain is affected. This unique challenge is 
exemplified by the experiences of the ARBRE project, which not only failed to deliver an 
operational bio-gasification plant, but also worsened farmer risk perceptions despite its initial (and 
notable) success in establishing commercial-scale PEC plantings (Piterou, Shackley & Upham, 
2008). It also helps to explain the apparently greater interest shown by both farmers and power 
plant developers in the use of existing, reliable feedstocks such as straw for bioenergy (Glithero, 
Ramsden & Wilson, 2013; Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden, 2013; F1, 2015). 
Simulating PEC uptake with Agent Based Modelling 
The interconnected challenges facing PEC deployment in make it difficult to anticipate 
system-level behaviours across the nascent sector. To date the majority of studies investigating 
PEC markets have focussed on the development of a particular aspect of the supply chain, for 
example the growth of biomass production to meet an exogenously-assumed market demand 
(Dunnett, Adjiman & Shah, 2008; Yagi & Nakata, 2011). Such research can offer only limited 
insight into the dynamics of developing interdependent services concurrently. Further, 
investigations of the non-economic barriers to PEC production have mostly focussed on 
operations and decision-making at the farm level (Alexander & Moran, 2013; Sherrington, Bartley 
& Moran, 2008; Glithero, Wilson & Ramsden, 2013; Wilson, Glithero & Ramsden, 2014; 
Augustenborg, Finnan, McBennett, et al., 2012; Villamil, Alexander, Silvis, et al., 2012). Whilst 
growers are obviously central it is clear that a number of additional stakeholder groups are also 
highly important, e.g. planting materials suppliers, crop management contractors, aggregators and 
consumers.  
Agent Based Modelling (ABM) is a simulation approach able to analyse the potential 
evolution of these interconnected issues. Using autonomous, heterogeneous decision-making 
agents to represent behaviours and interactions in a complex system it is possible to explore how 
the system may evolve. In combination the actions of multiple agents give rise to emergent 
‘system level’ behaviours, which can be investigated in terms of their spatial and dynamic 
characteristics – a goal that is intractable with many other modelling approaches (Chappin, 2011; 
van Dam, Adhitya, Srinivasan, et al., 2009; Zimmermann, Heckelei & Domínguez, 2009). ABM 
is thus considered suitable for studying situations in which system-level behaviours cannot be 
reliably deduced by aggregating the properties of individual actors, e.g. where extreme behaviours 
may be influential, where actors may behave irrationally, where the distribution of actors across 
a network is influential, and/or where co-ordination and collaboration between multiple actors is 
important (van Dam, Adhitya, Srinivasan, et al., 2009; Chappin, 2011; Badham, 2010; Scholl, 
2001). Currently these are all prominent features in the UK’s nascent PEC supply chain.  
The next stage of this project will explore the insights which ABM can provide about the 
effectiveness of alternative policy approaches to support PEC production, taking account of 
interconnected roles of farmers, crop service contractors and aggregator firms. A model will be 
constructed to interrogate the increase in PEC uptake that might occur under different policy 
portfolio conditions, with different dominant business models, and under different market 
structures. It is suggested that analysis of the behaviours, interactions and decision-making 
processes of these various stakeholder groups – to date largely ignored in the literature - could aid 
the formulation of policy portfolios better equipped to promote PEC cultivation.  
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